Summary. This paper establishes a correspondence between statistical disclosure control and forensic statistics regarding their common use of the concept of 'probability of identification'. The paper then seeks to investigate what lessons for disclosure control can be learnt from the forensic identification literature. The main lesson considered here is that disclosure risk assessment cannot, in general, ignore the search method employed by an intruder seeking to achieve disclosure. The effects of using several search methods are considered. Through consideration of the plausibility of assumptions and 'worst case' approaches, the papers suggests how the impact of search method can be handled. The paper focuses on foundations of disclosure risk assessment, providing some justification for some modelling assumptions underlying some existing record level measures of disclosure risk. The paper illustrates the effects of using different search methods in a numerical example based upon microdata from a sample from the 2001 Census.
Introduction
Statistical agencies conducting surveys or censuses need to protect the confidentiality of respondents when releasing outputs (Doyle et al, 2001) . A major aim in confidentiality protection is to avoid identification. For example, the key 'confidentiality guarantee' in the National Statistics Code of Practice (National Statistics, 2004, p.7) is that 'no statistics will be produced that are likely to identify an individual' . Bethlehem et al. (1990) refer to similar principles elsewhere, such as in the International Statistical Institute Declaration on Professional Ethics. Concern about identification is particularly pronounced for releases of microdata, where the identification of a record in a microdata file might lead to the disclosure of the values of sensitive variables (Paass, 1988; Duncan and Lambert, 1989; Reiter, 2005) .
Principles of confidentiality protection, such as that embodied in the National
Statistics Code of Practice, are often expressed broadly and require refinement if they are to be implemented in practice. The concept of identification itself seems fairly clear: it involves linking an element of the output, such as a microdata record, with a known individual or other specified unit (Bethlehem et al., 1990) . More challenging is the concept of the probability of identification, to which confidentiality protection principles often refer. For example, the phrase 'likely to' in the National Statistics confidentiality guarantee is a probabilistic notion. The probability of identification is often referred to as identification risk or the risk of identity disclosure in the statistical disclosure control (SDC hereafter) literature (e.g. Paass, 1988; Duncan and Lambert, 1989; Reiter, 2005) .
The assessment of this probability is not straightforward, in particular since the underlying uncertainty might arise from a variety of sources, such as: whether an attempt at identification by an intruder might take place, what auxiliary information an intruder might be able to use to attempt identification or which elements of the output or known individuals might be selected for an attempt at identification. Some of these sources of uncertainty may be handled by appropriate definition and alternative assumptions, such as via the components of risk approach of Marsh et al. (1991) . Nevertheless, there remain challenges in assessing the uncertainty, as will become apparent in this paper.
One field of statistical application where there has been rigorous discussion and development of methods for assessing the probability of identification is forensic science (e.g. Dawid, 1994; Balding and Donnelly, 1995) . The aim of this paper is, first, to establish a correspondence between the forensic identification literature and that on SDC and then to consider the relevance of some ideas from the former literature to the assessment of identification risk in an SDC context.
One particular implication of the forensic identification literature, upon which we shall focus, is that the probability of identification may depend upon the search method used by an intruder to select an element of the output and a known individual in the population for linking. While the SDC literature has acknowledged that intruders might employ different search methods to improve their chances of disclosure (e.g. Duncan and Lambert, 1989; Lambert, 1993) , expressions for identification risk appearing in the SDC literature (e.g. Paass, 1988) are generally not dependent on the search method, for given auxiliary information. Following the forensic identification literature, we shall show how such dependence can arise. This finding makes the task of disclosure risk assessment harder, since the search method employed by a hypothetical intruder is necessarily unknown. We shall discuss how this problem might be addressed.
We shall argue that the assessment of identification risk in SDC may be viewed as a generalization of a forensic identification problem. As a consequence, we shall consider how forensic identification approaches may be extended to identification risk assessment in SDC. Our focus will be on the foundations of risk assessment methodology. We shall, however, outline an application in section 6 and provide some numerical illustrations using data from the 2001 Census.
Our focus in an SDC context will be on microdata, although much of this paper will also be relevant to any form of output where identification is relevant, i.e. where there is concern about the linking of elements of the output to known individuals (or other specified units). Our discussion will apply to cases where SDC methods, such as perturbation (Willenborg and de Waal, 2001) , have been applied, provided that each record of the resulting microdata (or element of the output) can still be interpreted as having originated from a given individual. Otherwise, it is not clear that there is reason to be concerned about identification.
We are not the first to observe the connection between forensic science and SDC.
The reference to 'fingerprinting' in Willenborg and de Waal (2001) provides a simple example. A deeper but more indirect connection may be traced via discussions of connections between forensic science and record linkage, e.g. Copas and Hilton (1990) , and connections between record linkage and SDC, e.g. Paass (1988) .
We shall begin in Section 2 by introducing a basic mapping between the two problems of forensic identification and disclosure risk assessment. A formal framework will then be set out in Section 3 to encompass both problems, and it will be indicated how the latter may be treated as a generalization of the former. In Section 4, we restrict attention to situations where an intruder seeks to achieve identification by a matching approach. The nature of identification risk for this approach and, in particular, the impact of different kinds of search methods are discussed in Section 5, with an illustration in Section 6. Finally, in Section 7 we discuss the broad conclusions and their SDC context.
The basic correspondence between forensic identification and SDC
To introduce the correspondence, we first set out the two problems in prototypical form.
In forensic identification (e.g. Balding and Donnelly, 1995) , a crime has been committed by an unknown culprit, who belongs to a specified population. The prosecuting authority identifies a member of this population as a suspect and brings the suspect to court. Identification occurs if the suspect and the culprit are identical, i.e. the suspect committed the crime or, in other words, the suspect is guilty. Data relevant to identification consist of values of variables observed both on the suspect and at the scene of the crime, e.g. from fingerprints, DNA profiles or eye witness testimony.
In identification risk assessment for microdata (e.g. Paass, 1988) , a microdata file is to be released, based upon data provided by a sample of responding units from a population in a survey or census. The file consists of records for these sample units, each
with the values of several variables. An intruder, i.e third party, has information about one or more known units in the population and seeks to link one of these with one of the records. Identification occurs if the selected known unit is identical to the responding unit which provided data for the record. Data relevant to identification consist of values of variables which are both recorded in the microdata and available to the intruder for the known units. These are often called key variables.
The correspondence between the two problems is summarised in Table 1 . The crime corresponds to cooperation by a responding unit in a survey or other form of data collection, normally undertaken under some pledge of confidentiality. (Given most agencies' desire to avoid non-response, the correspondence is ironic!) The culprit corresponds to the responding unit. For simplicity, we shall generally suppose that both the culprit and the respondent are individuals. They each belong to some specified population. The prosecuting authority corresponds to the intruder. The suspect, identified by the prosecuting authority, corresponds to the individual chosen by the intruder for linking to a given record in the microdata. To assess the probability that the suspect is guilty, the court will use evidence which links the suspect to the scene of the crime via some shared characteristics, which correspond to the key variables. Some of the other forms of correspondence in Table 1 will be returned to in Section 3.
In the forensic identification problem there is just one crime, one culprit and one suspect. (Note that if the crime is committed by several individuals jointly then we use the term culprit to denote this cluster of individuals. Likewise, the suspect may consist of a cluster of individuals who are suspected to have committed the crime jointly.) The forensic identification problem therefore corresponds to a special case of the disclosure risk assessment problem, where there is just a single record in the microdata and where the intruder links just one known individual to this record. We thus view the SDC problem as generalizing the forensic identification problem to the case where multiple crimes are committed and there are multiple potential suspects that might be linked to these crimes.
Formalisation of the correspondence
We now seek to expand upon and formalise the correspondence introduced in the previous section. We begin in Section 3.1. by setting out our general framework for assessing identification risk in the context of SDC. Then, in Section 3.2., we discuss how the forensic identification problem may be considered in this framework.
SDC problem
We consider a rectangular microdata file in which each record contains values on a common set of variables for a unit in a finite population U of size N. The units might in principle take different forms, for example households or businesses, but here we shall assume that they are individuals for simplicity. The microdata file might have been subject to perturbation by SDC methods, provided that it remains meaningful to associate each record with a unique individual.
We follow Paass (1988) and assume, hypothetically, that an intruder seeks to link one or more microdata records to one or more known individuals in the population using the values of certain key variables observed in both the microdata and on the known individuals. The known individuals might be drawn from a different source available to third parties, for example a database consisting of multiple records containing values of the key variables.
We define identification risk as the probability that a link between a particular record and a particular known individual is correct, conditional on an intruder having selected this record and this individual for linkage using a specified search method and specified auxiliary information. 
where microdata X and population X consist of the values assumed available to the intruder on X for records in the microdata and on X for individuals in the population, respectively.
We suppose that the probability in (1) refers to two possible kinds of stochastic mechanism: first, a superpopulation model for the generation of the values X and X , which may include a stochastic SDC mechanism used to perturb X or measurement error mechanisms affecting both X and X ; and second, the selection of r and B , i.e. the combination of the search method and any probability sampling scheme (and nonresponse mechanism) which led to the selection of the respondents, underlying the microdata, from the population.
We may compare the identification risk in (1) with the probability
, representing the uncertainty faced by the intruder when assessing whether an arbitrary record r belongs to an arbitrary known individual B, prior to any search, assuming the same information on X and X is available. Such probabilities are considered by Paass (1988) and Reiter (2005) . If this probability and the probability in (1) are the same then the search method is said to be ignorable. If this condition holds then disclosure risk assessment should be easier, since the search method of a hypothetical intruder is necessarily unknown. However, we shall show in section 5.2.
that search methods need not necessarily be ignorable and we shall discuss in section 5.4.
how we might deal with this possibility.
The probability in (1) is to be interpreted from the perspective of the releasing agency or disclosure auditor, based upon a set of stated assumptions about what auxiliary information might be available and the various stochastic mechanisms above. These assumptions are taken to be ones that could be publicly defended as realistic or correspond to confidentiality protection guidelines.
Forensic Identification
We now outline the corresponding set-up in forensic identification, following the analogy set out in Section 2. The microdata sample is reduced to a single record r corresponding to the culprit ( ) A r committing the crime and B becomes the suspect, observed to have a particular combination of traits, i.e. key variables, known to be shared by the criminal.
For simplicity, we conceive of the criminal and the suspect as individuals, although these might be groups of individuals working together. The population consists of the set of individuals who could have committed the crime and the search method refers to the selection of B from this population. There is only one culprit and hence the search method does not refer to the selection of A. In the SDC set-up, ( ) A r might therefore be interpreted as having committed the 'crime' of acting as a respondent in a survey, providing data upon which the given microdata record has been based.
The evidence recovered from the crime scene about the culprit is denoted A X . The corresponding characteristics of the suspect are denoted B X . Again the key variables may be recorded in different ways, for example if A X includes variables obtained from eyewitness accounts then these may be subject to measurement error. The identification risk corresponds to the probability that the suspect is guilty, that is that B is the same person as A. 
Linkage by matching
The discussion in Sections 2 and 3 applies to a very wide class of possible search methods. In practice, an important class of methods, relevant to both SDC and forensic identification, may be defined in terms of matching. In this case, there is a decision rule with a binary outcome, match or non-match, for any pair ( , ) Such matching approaches have been widely considered in the forensic identification literature. For example, Kingston (1965) defines identification in terms of the same kind of set r S as above. We shall return to example (i) in Section 6.
Identification Risk for Linkage by Matching
In this section we consider the nature of the probability of identification in (1) for the kinds of linkage methods described in Section 4. Sections 5.1. and 5.2. will focus on the case of a single record, as in forensic identification. The more general case will be considered in Sections 5.3 and 5.4.
Basic Formulation for a Single Record
We begin by considering an arbitrary record r in the microdata, ignoring the remaining microdata records, as in the forensic identification case. We define r S as in Section 4 and let r F denote the size of this set. We assume that any discrepancies of measurement between X and X are allowed for in the matching rule sufficiently so that Suppose that, using the linkage approach, an intruder finds an individual B in r S .
We initially assume that r F is known. By assumption about the linkage rule and the fact that the remaining records are being ignored, the key variable values ( ) , 
Under fairly weak conditions on the mechanism leading to the selection of r and B, the expression in (2) reduces to
For example, (3) might be questionable in an SDC context is where the intruder begins with an arbitrary target individual in the population, unequal probability sampling is employed in the selection of the microdata sample and a match is observed which is unique in the microdata. In this case, the r F possible samples that could lead to this observed outcome are not necessarily equally likely if the probability function in (2) is defined in terms of the sampling scheme. Hence (3) may not hold. Nevertheless, in this case it appears difficult to arrive at an alternative to 1/ r F for the right hand side of (3), which is a function of information which an intruder might realistically have in practice, and we
shall not pursue such concerns here. For the remainder of the paper we shall suppose that expression (2) does reduce to expression (3).
The simple expression 1/ r F in (3) has been noted by several authors, both in the forensic identification literature, e.g. Kingston (1965) , and in the SDC literature, e.g. Duncan and Lambert (1989) . The difficulty with (3) in practice is that r F will generally be unknown. Indeed, in the SDC context a key consideration is to ensure that the form of release should not permit key variables to be available where r F might be known to a potential intruder and be small, say one or two. When r F is unknown, we remove it from the conditioning set in (2) to give:
under our assumption that (2) reduces to (3), and hence
where the expectation is with respect to the conditional distribution Pr( | ( ) , , r r r F A r S B S ∈ ∈ search method) of r F given the observed events. The problem of determining the identification risk then reduces to one of determining this distribution.
We now consider how to obtain an expression for this distribution, following the approach used in the forensic identification literature. This involves specifying both a superpopulation model, governing the probability process underlying the event A standard superpopulation model (e.g. Kingston,1965; Dawid, 1994) which treats the size, N, of the population as fixed, is that the , ri Z i U ∈ , are independent and identically distributed Bernoulli trials with p denoting the probability of a match. This implies that r F is Binomially distributed with parameters N and p and we refer to this as the Binomial model. The relation between these models and some models used in SDC will be considered in Section 6. We shall treat p as known, for simplicity, in the remainder of this section. In forensic identification applications, p will often be estimated from a population database, possibly one from which a suspect has been selected. In SDC applications, p might similarly be estimated from a database available to an intruder, but also from multiple records in the microdata, as will be discussed in Section 6. The latter option has no analogue in forensic identification.
In the following section, we set out a number of possible search methods considered in the forensic identification literature and discuss the nature of the conditional distribution for r F and the expression for the risk in (4) given these search methods and the Binomial model.
Search Methods from forensic identification literature
In this section, we describe a series of search methods, labelled r1, r2,… to signify that the search begins with a specified record.
Search Method r1: suspect is selected by searching the population randomly until a match is found.
This method may be illustrated in the SDC context by the 'journalist scenario ' of Paass (1988) , where a journalist selects a record from the microdata with an unusual combination of values of the key variables and tries to find an known matching individual in the population by searching through sources accessible to the journalist until a match is found. The implicit assumption here is that the 'systematic' element of the journalist' s method of searching the population is fully captured by the matching rule and that, otherwise, the search is equally likely to lead to any one of the r F members of r S .
Under this search method, we may write Pr( | ( ) , under this search method is Binomial with parameters 1 N − and p (Lenth, 1986; Dawid, 1994, p.167) . Straightforward calculation using the Binomial density shows that the expectation in (4) has the closed form expression:
An implicit assumption here is that N and p are known. A further assumption is that y, the number of non-matches arising before the intruder finds a match, is unrecorded and hence not conditioned upon. The effect of recording y will be considered in method r3.
Search Method r2: suspect is drawn at random from the population and found to match.
This method appears less plausible in the SDC context, since the expected payoff to a potential intruder seems likely to be too low if no search is undertaken. The nearest parallel appears to be the case of 'spontaneous recognition' (Willenborg and de Waal, 2001, p.62) where an intruder happens, by chance, to observe a match between a microdata record and a known individual.
For this search method, the event r B S ∈ is informative about r F , making larger values of r F more likely. We may write:
F A r S B S F A r S B S F A r S
where implicitly each term also conditions on the search method. The first term on the right hand side of (6) (Dawid, 1994; Balding and Donnelly, 1995) . It is straightforward to show that the constant of proportionality in (6) the right hand side of (6) and hence (c.f. Dawid,1994; Balding and Donnelly, 1995) expression (7) is modified to:
Search Method r4: suspect is found to be unique match in a database.
If a search is made among y+1 potential suspects in a database, the same probability calculations may be made as for method r3 with y known (Balding and Donnelly, 1995) and so the identification risk is the same for these two methods. In the SDC context, this method corresponds again to the journalist scenario where the database represents a particular source available to the journalist.
These results for methods r3 and r4 have been subject to some debate in the forensic identification literature. Expression (8) implies that the greater the value of y, i.e.
the longer the search, the greater the risk of identification, although this increase will tend to be minor if the fraction of the population searched, / y N , is small. This contrasts with an alternative argument, advanced for example by Stockmarr (1999) , that the risk may be severely reduced by such a database search. See Dawid (2001) and Balding (2002) for some of the ensuing debate. To illustrate this debate in an SDC context, suppose that a journalist claims to have found a unique match between a named individual and a record in a public use microdata file released by a statistical agency. On discussion, the journalist admits to have found the match by searching through a large database of 100,000 individuals. The agency might claim, following the alternative argument, that it is not surprising that a match has been found as a result of such an extensive search and argues that, as a result, little weight should be given to the observed match, i.e. the probability that the match is correct should be treated as small. This paper' s position, following e.g. Balding (2002) , is to suggest that such an argument would be misleading.
It is true that the probability of finding a match does increase the longer the search and thus that the journalist' s discovery may be unremarkable overall. Nevertheless, for the particular record for which a match is found, the fact that a further proportion of the population has been searched for a match without success increases rather than decreases the probability that the match is correct. The issue is then whether the value of this increased probability for this record (i.e. expression (8) under the Binomial model, assuming p is known) is of concern.
Search Method r5: method r1 is extended by continued searching.
If the search is continued without a further match being found then this method may be treated as equivalent to either methods r3 or r4, with y equal to the number of nonmatches. If the continued search leads to another individual being found which matches, then Dawid (1994) provides an expression for the resulting risk, assuming y is not recorded. In the extreme, if a complete search of the population revealed r F , the number of individuals in the population matching A, the risk would again become 1/ r F , as in (3).
Generalization: Search Methods for SDC
Attention was restricted to the case of a single record in the previous two sections. In the general SDC setting, however, there will be multiple records in the microdata. Possible extensions of the previous search methods to this case will be considered in this section and are summarised in Table 2 . These extensions are of two types, termed fishing and directed searches by Paass (1988) .
In a fishing method, the intruder first selects a record (or records) in the microdata, possibly a record that he/she expects to be easier to identify as a result of having unusual values or combinations of values of key variables. For example, Paass (1988) considers an expenditure survey, where an intruder might select an individual purchasing two or more boats. The intruder then seeks to find a match for this record using one of the methods r1, r2... above. The judgement about the record being unusual might be based upon the microdata, in the extreme if the record is unique in the sample with respect to X (i.e. does not match any other record). We let r1u, r2u… denote the use of search methods r1, r2… for a record which is unique in this sense. We treat the case where the intruder selects multiple records for linkage as repetition of methods r1, r1u etc.
In what Paass (1988) refers to as a directed search, the intruder begins with a known target individual (or individuals) in the population and then searches for a match in the microdata. Out of six scenarios considered by Paass (1988) , only one (the journalist scenario above) involves fishing. The remaining five are directed searches. In three of these, it is assumed that the intruder begins with a particular individual in the population and then searches the microdata file for a match. In the remaining two scenarios the intruder begins with a set of known individuals in the population and then seeks matches for each of these in the microdata file. Duncan and Lambert (1989) , Lambert (1993) and Reiter (2005) also focus on the case of a directed search.
By interchanging the role of the known population individuals and the microdata records, the search methods in Section 5.2 may be transposed to the case of a directed search. We assume that any intruder who has managed to gain access to the microdata would search the whole file and would not stop at an intermediate stage, for example, at the first match to the target individual, B. We thus reject the counterparts of methods r1, r2 and r3 as unrealistic, since they involve either stopping (r1 and r3) or no search at all (r2). The counterpart of method r4, treating the microdata file as the counterpart of the database, is:
Search method B1: for a given target individual B, a unique matching microdata record is found.
The use of B in the notation B1 is intended to signify that the search begins with a specified known individual B. The intruder cannot search for matches among individuals falling outside the microdata sample and thus the counterpart of method r5 is rejected as impossible. We also reject methods which generate more than one match in a search of the microdata, on the grounds of restricting attention to worst cases. It would be possible to qualify method B1 by some method for selecting the target individual. For example, a method which selected the individual as unique within a database might be denoted B1u.
It would also be possible for the intruder to select more than one known individual for linkage, for example the set of individuals within a database, resulting in an effective repetition of method B1. We shall, however, only explore such extensions implicitly through consideration of B1.
Generalization: Risk assessment for SDC
In this section, we consider the generalization of the results on identification risk in Sections 5.1 and 5.2. to the case of SDC for the search methods discussed in Section 5.3.
We also seek to compare these methods with respect to risk in order to narrow the class of search methods which it is reasonable for a disclosure risk assessor to consider. This is desirable in practice since dependence of the risk upon the search method complicates the task of the assessor, given that the intruder will generally be hypothetical and hence the search method unknown. We shall argue in this section that it is reasonable for the assessor to restrict attention among the search methods to r1u and B1 and their extensions to repeated records or known individuals. We consider two types of search methods in turn, under the headings discussed in the Section 5.3.
Fishing methods
We suppose first that the intruder begins by selecting a microdata record and then seeks a match in the population. The expressions for identification risk in Section 5.2. were derived for arbitrary records and hence will still apply provided the selection does not depend on some event which is informative about r F and any information provided by other records is ignored. Consider, following an example of Paass (1988) , the case of an expenditure survey where there is a separate code in the microdata for individuals who purchase two or more boats. In one form of attack, an intruder might decide in advance to select any individual who falls into this category for a matching attempt on grounds of prior judgement that this is an unusual category. In this case, this selection is not dependent on any observed event and the expressions for identification risk in Section 5.2. will continue to apply, under the assumptions made there provided we ignore observed data from other records. (This argument might be formalised under a given superpopulation model using the irrelevance of stopping rules, following Berger and Wolpert, 1984, p.74) .
In a second form of attack, the intruder might seek an unusual category on the basis of observing the microdata, for example it might be observed that there is only one individual in the microdata who purchases two or more boats. Here, conditioning the risk on the search method (see (1)) corresponds to conditioning on this observed sample uniqueness. These two forms of attack correspond to the distinction between methods r1, r2,… of Section 5.2. and methods r1u, r2u,… of Section 5.3.
It follows from our definition in (1), however, that even in the case of method r1
we should condition the risk on microdata X , i.e. the information provided by other microdata records and, in particular, sample uniqueness if it occurs. Thus the risk for an individual in the microdata who was selected by method r1 and subsequently found to be sample unique should be the same as if the same individual was selected by the intruder using method rlu after observing sample uniqueness. The risk for method r1 will tend to be higher if it is observed that the individual is not sample unique and hence, if concern is with the worst cases, we may argue that it is sufficient to restrict attention to r1u.
In fact, if the sampling fraction is small, as is common in many SDC applications, sample uniqueness will not carry much information about r F under the Binomial model where p is given, since r F will be primarily determined by the behaviour of non-sample individuals. See section 6 for more detailed discussion of this point. We may therefore expect the risk for methods r1u, r2u,… to be very similar to that for methods r1, r2,… in these circumstances. For simplicity, we shall now compare risk for the latter methods and then infer that similar comparative properties will apply to the former methods. We suppose that the event of sample uniqueness represents the worst case, in terms of what microdata information the intruder might use to select a record for matching, and thus suppose that it is unnecessary to consider conditioning (1) on other features of microdata X .
Suppose then that one of the methods r1, r2, … , r5 is employed and that the selection of the record is not informative so that the expressions for identification risk in Section 5.2. still apply. Note that these results also depend upon assumptions about the sampling scheme, discussed in Section 5.1. We now consider each of methods r2, … , r5 in turn, comparing them with method r1, and argue that it is reasonable to restrict attention amongst the search methods r1 to r5 just to method r1.
Consider first search method r2. We have already suggested in Section 5.2. that this method is less plausible than the other methods. Moreover, search method r1 will, in general, lead to higher risk than method r2 since the size biasing in the latter method makes larger values of r F more likely and these are associated with lower risk. Balding and Donnelly (1995) give an example where N=101, p=0.004 and the expressions in (5) and (7) are 0.826 and 0.714 respectively. Thus, disregarding method r2 but considering method r1 will be a conservative approach to risk assessment.
Methods r3 and r4 may lead to slightly higher risk than method r2, but the risk will only be higher than method r1 if a substantial proportion of the population is searched.
For example, if N=101 and p=0.004 then1/{1 ( 1 ) } 0.826
almost half the population must be searched. Indeed, using the approximation that N is large, p is small and 1 Np << considered in Balding and Donnelly, it will in general be necessary for at least half the population to be searched (i.e. / 0.5 y N > ) for methods r3 or r4 to lead to a higher risk than method r1. Principles governing SDC often enable such 'disproportionate' amounts of intruder information to be ruled out. For example the National Statistics Code of Practice (National Statistics, 2004, pp.7, 8) states, in relation to the use of SDC methods, that assumptions about the "information likely to be available to third parties" should be made "against the following standard: it would take a disproportionate amount of time, effort and expertise for an intruder to identify a statistical unit to others, or to reveal information about that unit not already in the public domain".
Method r5 may also be disregarded on the grounds that the only relevant cases under this method reduce to those under methods r3 and r4 since it seems reasonable to discount the possibility of the intruder reporting that they have found a second match, because this would be expected to substantially reduce the risk by ruling out the possibility of population uniqueness. The resulting risk would be at most 0.5. For example, for the case N=101, p=0.004, expression (4.8) in Dawid (1994) implies the risk is 0.467.
Finally, let us turn to methods r1u-r5u. As discussed earlier, we may expect the risk for these methods to be similar to that for methods r1-r5 for a given selected individual and thus we suggest the above argument for restricting attention to r1 may be extended to justify restricting attention to r1u out of the former methods. As noted earlier, it is appropriate to condition the risk for r1 on the observed occurrence or otherwise of sample uniqueness and, taking the worst case, since the risk of r1 given sample uniqueness is the same as the risk for r1u, we argue it is sufficient to restrict attention to the latter method.
Directed Searches
Turning to method B1, we note first that it is isomorphic to method r4 if we interchange the role of the microdata and the database. Under this isomorphism, the indicator variables ri Z are translated into variables Bi Z for individuals i U ∈ , indicating whether i X matches B X . For individuals i outside the microdata sample, i X is defined to contain the values of the key variables which would be recorded in the microdata if i were selected into the sample. It is assumed that 1 BB Z = . The corresponding Binomial model is that the Bi Z are independent and identically distributed Bernoulli trials with p denoting the probability of a match.
It then follows, as above, that under this new Binomial model, the identification risk is given by
where n is size of the microdata sample.
We expect that, for the same individual, p and p will be of similar magnitude in many practical applications. As discussed in the previous section, expression (9) (with p p = ) will only be greater than the risk for method r1 if the sampling fraction, / n N , is high, roughly greater than 0.5. Since we expect the risks for r1u and r1 to be similar, we expect that in cases with small sampling fractions, it will usually be reasonable for the disclosure risk assessor to disregard B1 in favour of r1u.
An Application with Categorical Key Variables and No Misclassification
We now illustrate the assessment of risk in one kind of SDC application which arises with sample microdata from population censuses or social surveys. It is assumed that the key variables are categorical and identically measured in the two sources, with linkage based upon exact matching, i.e. example (i) of section 4. In this case, we label the combinations of categories of the key variables by x so that the earlier expression X for the key variables may now take the integer values 1,...,
These combinations may be interpreted as cells in a multi-way contingency table. The Binomial model considered earlier implies a multinomial model for this contingency table. Since we assume that X is identical to X and that linkage is based upon exact matching, the Binomial model in section 5.1 for a given record with X x = implies that the events i X x = for different population units i U ∈ are independent and identically distributed with Pr( )
where the subscript x is added to the probability p to indicate that this model relates to
Assuming that the Binomial model holds for all records with all possible values 1,..., x K = , it follows that the i X are independent and identically distributed random variables with Pr( )
( ∑ (McCullagh and Nelder, 1989, p.165) . Even unconditionally, it may be argued that the two models have very similar SDC consequences when the x p are small and N is large (Chen and KellerMcNulty, 1998 ).
In practice, the x p are unknown, but inference about them may be made using the multiple records of the microdata. As discussed in section 5. (Skinner and Holmes, 1998; Elamir and Skinner, 2006) , in order to obtain more 'realistic' probabilities of identification, which may vary across cells. We now illustrate this with a numerical example, drawing on Skinner and Shlomo ) and may be used to make inference about the parameters x p . We suppose that such inference is conducted using a log-linear model for x p including all main effects and two-way interactions (e.g. Agresti, 2002) . Using the population data for validation, this model has been found to generate 'reasonable' disclosure risk assessments both for these data (Skinner and Shlomo, 2005) and similar data sources (Skinner and Holmes, 1998; Elamir and Skinner, 2006) . Let ˆx p denote the maximum likelihood estimate of x p under this multinomial log-linear model. In Table 3 we present values of ˆx p for three individuals selected from the sample. We consider 
i.e. as in expression (5) but with N replaced by 1 N n − + . Table 3 shows that the impact of this change is minor in all three cases. Inspection of expressions (5) and (10) indicates that this will generally be the case if the sampling fraction n/N is small.
We next consider search method r2. As expected from the discussion in section 5.4.1, Table 3 displays lower risk estimates for this method than method r1, although the reduction is not great. The risk for methods r3 and r4 is given by expression (8). This expression depends on the number y+1 of individuals in the database used for matching (in method r4). We now calculate how large y+1 must be for the risk of methods r3 or r4
to exceed the risk of method r1u. Equating (8) and (10) and solving for y+1, we find that it is necessary to search databases of sizes at least 463,000, 17,300 or 5,550 for the minimum, median and maximum cases respectively. Most importantly, we find that for the most risky case we must search a database of almost half the size of the population for method r4 to lead to a higher risk than method r1u. This accords with the discussion in section 5.4.1.
Finally, we consider method B1. Expression (9) is the same as expression (8) for method r4 when p p = (which we are assuming in this section) and when the size y+1 of the database is the same as the sample size n . We have 4750 n ≈ and since this is smaller than the three database sizes above, method B1 always leads to a lower risk than method r1u. In fact, it gives very similar results to method r2 since the sampling fraction is small.
In summary, we conclude from the numerical comparison in Table 3 that it is sufficient to consider only method r1u as a worse case, but that the values of the risk for all the methods are of a similar magnitude so that the 'worst case' approach would not be overly conservative if an intruder employed one of the other methods. Following the discussion in section 5, we may expect to be able to generalise the finding that method r1u is the worst case to any situation where the sampling fraction is small, X X = and any errors in the estimation of x p can be ignored.
Discussion
A key objective of SDC for microdata release is to limit the ability of an intruder to achieve identification. This requires limiting the identification risk for any record which might be selected for linkage. A main theme of this paper has been to consider, following discussion in the forensic identification literature, how this identification risk may depend upon the search method used by the intruder to select the record for linkage. We have discussed how this dependence might occur and have suggested that, in practice, it may be handled by considering worst cases amongst a number of plausible alternative search methods. Our discussion suggests a focus on the method denoted r1u earlier, a focus which is consistent with the modelling foundations of approaches in Skinner and Holmes (1998) and Elamir and Skinner (2006) for categorical key variables. This paper therefore provides some justification for the assumptions in these two papers. Another possible analogous application of the ideas in this paper would be to the assessment of the threat to disclosure posed by record linkage methods based upon a mixture of categorical and continuous key variable.
In this paper we have defined identification risk at the record level. In practice, it will often be necessary in SDC work to make judgements about risk at the file level. This may be achieved by aggregating record level measures, as discussed by Lambert (1993) , or by defining a file-level measure directly. For example, Skinner and Elliot (2002) consider two measures which may be represented as two alternative averages of values of 1/ r F (c.f. equation (4)). The two measures correspond to alternative possible search methods: one to the intruder drawing a sample unique record in the microdata at random (with equal probabilities); the other to the intruder selecting at random any population unit which match a sample unique record. The two measures can, however, take very different values, illustrating how such file level measures can be very sensitive to assumptions about the intruder' s search method. Indeed, we suggest this sensitivity is rather greater than the dependence of record level measures upon the search method, as discussed in this paper.
There are a number of other pros and cons of file-level vs. record level measures.
File-level measures, such as the population-averaged measure in Skinner and Elliot (2002) , not only have the advantage that they are simple but they can also be estimated robustly, whereas inference about record-level measures may be expected to be more model-sensitive (given the relative amount of 'information' available at each level). On the other hand, the aims of SDC are often expressed in a way that seems to correspond better to a definition at the record level. For example, the requirement in the National Statistics Code of Practice (National Statistics, 2004, p.11 ) that " the guarantee of confidentiality must be applied equally to all statistical units" suggests reference to a unit level concept of disclosure risk. Model sensitivity can be handled in the framework of a sensitivity analysis, which seems a necessary feature of disclosure risk assessment in any case if alternative sets of assumptions about the possible auxiliary key information available to an intruder are to be considered, as well as alternative assumptions about possible measurement error. The sensitivity analysis could also be used to handle the selection of alternative types of records. If it is desired to aggregate record level measures across records and if large values of the measure are of most concern then a suitable approach might be count the number of records for which the identification risk is above a given threshold (Lambert, 1993, p.317) . Combining record-level measures by counting or averaging seems likely to be more robust to model specification than taking the maximum value. 
